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CRIMINAL LAw - INSANE PERSONS - COMPETENCY To STAND
TRIAL* - Mental unsoundness in a person accused of a crime raises
two distinct legal questions. One is the question of the individual's responsibility for his behavior and the other is the question
of the individual's competency to enter into the legal procedures
of trial or punishment.1 In recent years considerable attention
has been given to matters of responsibility, 2 but relatively little
attention has been paid to the problem of incompetency and especially to the consequences of incompetency proceedings. In order
to analyze and evaluate the operations of the Michigan law in the
area of incompetency to stand trial,3 two psychiatrists joined two
law students to conduct field research at Ionia State Hospital to
which all persons found incompetent to stand trial are committed.4
This comment reports and analyzes the results of this field research. Attention is given also to the merits of alternative procedures for the commitment and treatment of incompetents.

I.

INCOMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS -

COMMON LAW

It was the rule at common law that an accused could not be
required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime when
he was so mentally disordered that he could not meet the common
• The authors wish to thank Dr. R. E. Cooper, Medical Superintendent of Ionia State
Hospital, and his staff for their cooperation in this study.
1 WEllIOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428, 430 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as WEllIOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER].
2 See HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw ch. 14 (2d ed. 1960); WEIHoFEN, THE URCE
TO PUNISH (1956); B1ccs, THE Gun.TY MIND (1955); ROYAL CoMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISH•
MENT, REPORT (1949-1953).
3 M1CH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948).
4 The total patient population at Ionia was 1484 as of August 1960. Of these 755 are
classified as "criminal court referrals," 356 as Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 101 as convicts serving sentences (transferred to Ionia from prison), 140 as convicts with expired
sentences (adjudicated mentally ill in retention proceedings), ll8 as hoinicidal patients
transferred from civil institutions, 4 as ex-convicts declared mentally ill, and 10 unclassified.
The majority of "criininal court referrals" are those committed as incompetent to stand
trial. However, about 50 of the 755 are persons found not guilty of murder by reason of
insanity and cominitted under section 766.15c of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Additionally, of the 393 patients of all classifications currently on parole, approximately 200
had been committed for incompetency. Conclusions regarding the 755 are based upon a
representative and random sample of 77 patients whose records were studied. Selecting
at random one record of every five subjects in the appropriate category, we studied the
records of 21 persons discharged back to the committing court by the hospital during the
period July 1954 - December 1960; 20 records of -persons currently on parole; and ll records of persons discharged from parole since October 1947. Each subject's record was
examined for background information, nature of the judicial proceeding, and hospital
and parole experience. Further, ll patien_ts were interviewed by the two psychiatrists
participating in the study. The investigation was aided by the opportunity afforded us
by the hospital superintendent to observe a staff interview of a patient and to interview
the doctors on the hospital staff.
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law tests of competency; that is, when he could not understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, comprehend
his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and assist in
his defense.IS
The common-law judge had wide discretion in calling and
conducting a competency examination. Whether an examination
into the defendant's competency would be made at all depended
on whether the judge had reason to believe that the defendant
was mentally unable to proceed with trial. 6 It was often said that
once a competency examination was ordered, the judge was free
to use any method for determining the accused's competency which
was "discreet and convenient."7 Also the judge had discretion to
summon a jury to make the determination of competency or to
make such determination himself.8 If it was determined that the
accused was incompetent, the common-law practice seems to have
been to confine him in jail. Indeed, it had been held that in the
absence of statutes the judge had power only to order the incompetent confined in jail.9 He would then be tried at such time as
the judge determined his competency restored.
At the common law there was no right of appeal from the incompetency hearing itself, but the issue of the accused's competency could be raised on appeal from the criminal trial. Despite
authority that an accused's constitutional rights would be violated
if he were tried while incompetent,1° the judge's decision was
generally sustained unless it was clearly arbitrary.11 Since most
states have merely codified the common law in this field,12 wide
IS WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 431.
6 Id. at 433, 444.
7 See, e.g., People v. Rhinelander, 2 N.Y. Crim. 335
8 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 445, 446-47.
9 Hawie v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131 (1922).

(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1884).

10 Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) (trial of insane person under
indictment involving liberty or life violates due process); United States v. Gundelfinger,
98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (dictum) (fair trial embraces right to be mentally
present); United States ex rel. Mazy v. Ragen, 149 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1945) (dictum),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 791 (1946) (trial of insane person raises federal due process questions).
11 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 474.
12See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15:267 (1950); MINN. STAT. § 610.10 (1957); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 29·20-01 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.150 (1959).
From time to time statutes similar to the Michigan incompetency statute have been
attacked on the grounds that they violate the accused's state or federal constitutional
rights. Such attacks have been almost invariably rejected for the reason that a sanity hearing and commitment do not constitute a trial. These procedures are designed to protect
the accused, not to incriminate him. See cases collected in Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 434 (1953).
Although the Michigan statute has not been tested against the federal constitution, the
Michigan Supreme Court has held that this statute "preserves, instead of deprives [th~
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discretionary powers continue to be exercised by the trial courts
of these states.
II.

INCOMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS -

MICHIGAN

A. Commitment: Law and Operation
1. Law. The Michigan incompetency statute1 3 follows the

basic pattern of the common law. It requires the court to hold a
sanity hearing1 4 to determine the accused's competency to proceed
with trial when one accused of a felony "shall appear to be insane."
The question of the accused's competency can be raised by the
accused, the prosecuting attorney, or the court.1 is Whether the
defendant "appears to be insane" within the statute may be decided
either by the court or by a jury.16
If it is determined that the defendant does "appear to be insane," the court fixes a time and place for a hearing of the competency issue at which it "shall call 2 or more reputable physicians
and other credible witnesses to testify at said hearing, and [shall
call] the prosecuting attorney to aid in the examination and if it
be deemed necessary to call a jury for that purpose, [the court] is
fully empowered to compel the attendance of witnesses and
jurors."17
The statute retains the common law three-pronged test of incompetency: "[T]he test on the trial of [the defendant's competency]18 • • • shall be whether such person is [I] capable of underdefendant] . . . of due process of law." People v. Janek, 287 Mich. 563, 567, 283 N.W.
689, 690 (1939).
13 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948).
14 The statute actually directs the court to "inquire and ascertain the issue of insanity.'' MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.27 (1949). This is done by means of the sanity hearing.
15 If the defense desires to raise the issue of defendant's competency, written notice

to this effect must be given to the prosecuting attorney not less than four days before the
-scheduled date of trial. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.20 (1948).
16 "[W]hen a person accused of a felony shall appear to be insane • . . the court,
being certified by the jury or otherwise of the fact, shall carefully inquire and ascertain
the issue of insanity.'' MICH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948).
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.27 (1948).
18 The word "competency" is not used in the statute, but use of the co=on law
competency tests indicates that "competency" is in issue. The statute actually reads: "If
it is claimed that such person became insane after the commission of the felony with
which he is charged and before or during the trial thereon" then the test of whether he
is mentally able to be tried will be the common law competency test. Although this
provision has not been reviewed in Michigan, other states have interpreted similar clauses
to require that the accused must appear to have become insane since the commission of
the offense. This distinction based upon the time when the accused became mentally
unfit is not justified by the common law nor is it practiced by the Michigan courts. See
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 431-33.
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standing the nature and object of the proceedings against him and
[2] of comprehending his own condition in reference to such
proceedings and [3] of assisting in his defense in a rational or
reasonable manner."19
It would be expected that if the defendant is found to be incompetent, he would be sent to a rehabilitative institution. This
the statute does provide, but it does not use incompetency terminology or refer to the incompetency tests:
"If such person is found insane, the judge of said court
shall order that he be discharged from imprisonment and that
he be turned over to the sheriff for safe custody and removal
to Ionia state hospital, to which hospital such person shall be
committed to remain until restored to sanity."20
The use of "insane" and "sanity" can be explained by the fact
that it is this same provision which provides for examination and
commitment of persons found not responsible for criminal acts.
Both these and incompetents are sent to Ionia, and the general
word "insane" encompasses the criteria for commitment for both
groups. However, with respect to the criterion for commitment
of incompetents, reason would indicate that the legislature intended the three-pronged competency test to be used. 21
2. Operation. At the hearing to determine the competency
of the accused to stand trial "two reputable physicians" are required to testify regarding the accused's mental state. The influence which their testimony exerts upon the competency determination is substantial, for they speak as experts in a field shrouded
in mystery for both judge and jury. Not understanding the medical complexities associated with mental illness, the legal authorities enunciate legal policy objectives and broad competency tests
by way of statute and then rely upon the doctors to apply these
tests to the individual defendants.
Our study suggests that the Michigan statute's direction to
commit the accused if he cannot meet the competency test is being
very loosely applied in many cases. Several records studied at Ionia
indicated that the doctors confuse the legal standards for competency with those for responsibility. An example of this confusion
of legal concepts was evidenced by a report which read: "This man
19 MICH. CoMP.

LAWS § 767 2;7 (1948).
20 MICH. COMP. LAws § 767:2.7 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
21 Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to Conference Participants on Overcrowded Conditions at Ionia State Hospital, September 8, 1960.
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does not know right from wrong, he is incompetent, he is not able
to help his counsel, he should be committed to an institution
because he is insane and should be released only when he is found
to be sane." Most of the records which did not manifest such
confusion were form statements which simply parroted the incompetency test of the statute.22
The confusion of legal concepts is caused in part by the imprecise wording of the Michigan statute which codifies the threepronged common-law test as the criterion for testing the accused's
ability to proceed with trial but subsequently uses the word "insane" to indicate the criterion for committing him to Ionia State
Hospital. Another probable causal factor is that frequently the
"two reputable physicians" who make psychiatric determinations
have no psychiatric training. Also, in many cases a report on the
defendant's condition is prepared by a social worker or psychologist. After th'e doctor interviews the patient he adds a covering
letter to the psychologist's report suggesting that the accused be
committed.
The records also indicate that some of the examining physicians assumed the role of moral experts. In one case the doctor
recommended commitment because of the patient's "hostile and
aggressive tendencies." However, it may be supposed that those
defendants well enough for sentencing to prison exhibit similar
tendencies. In another instance the examining physicians said:
"We actually feel the patient could cooperate ·with counsel but
that it would be better if he were to be hospitalized in Ionia."
This departure from the physician's proper role as expert medical
witness seems to be based on two factors. First, the physician does
not understand that the legal objective is the narrow one of determining whether the defendant is competent to proceed ·with
trial but rather tends to think of his function as a broader one of
protecting society, the defendant, or both. Implicit in many of the
physicians' recommendations is the feeling that the individual
defendant is such a pathetic figure and so clearly not responsible
for his crime that he should not be consigned to prison. Second,
the physicians seem to believe that commitment to Ionia is infinitely preferable to a prison sentence. Misapprehending the purpose of the incompetency proceedings and his role in them, the
physician assumes the responsibility for insuring that the defendant is treated in a more humane atmosphere than a prison. Exam22 These

"form" reports were employed in 54 of the 129 records studied.
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pies of this type of distortion occurred in many of the hospital
records studied, but were most prominent in the records of elderly
persons or those who were obviously mentally defective.
It is our judgment that as a result of this loose application of
the competency tests, persons are being committed to Ionia who
are not in fact legally incompetent. This judgment is corroborated
by the fact that frequently the Ionia Hospital physicians' diagnosis of the accused varied from the opinion presented to the court
by the court-appointed physicians. It was not unusual to find that
the hospital staff found a newly-admitted patient was mentally ill
but nevertheless able to meet the legal competency standards.

B. Procedures at the Hospital
The Ionia State Hospital is overcrowded and understaffed.
The total patient population of 1484 as of August 1960 represents
a patient excess over maximum capacity of 262 persons or about
21 percent. Of the total number of patients approximately 755,
or 51 percent, were committed because incompetent to stand trial.
To administer to the needs of these patients there are but four
physicians including the superintendent of the hospital. Incompetency as a legal concept is not meaningful to these doctors, for
whether a person is "sane enough" for trial is a legal concept
incapable of precise medical evaluation and determination. Since
the doctors do not understand the law, nor their role in its administration, it is not surprising that clinical results bear scant resemblance to legal policy objectives.
A less obvious but perhaps more important problem concerns
the goals of the hospital. Patients' progress notes indicate that
the hospital staff frequently does not know what is expected of
them. The hospital's objective appears to be to restore the incompetent to "soundness of mind," a goal which could be, and in
practice is, very different from the goal of restoring the patient to
a condition which would permit him to stand trial. For most
categories of patients at Ionia23 the objective of "restoration to
sanity" is sound. It is easy to understand that this objective could
be unconsciously applied to the total patient population. Without
doubt much of the confusion regarding therapeutic goals for patients who are incompetent to stand trial results from the necessity
of establishing different standards of cure for the various classifica23

For a breakdown on the number of patients in each category, see note 4 supra.
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tions of patients at the hospital. A lack of clearcut therapeutic
goals results in a case such as the following: F. C., a twenty-five-yearold male, has been held as an incompetent patient for four years
while hospital personnel work toward achieving "insight into his
behavior" and "confession of his crime."
The therapeutic procedures carried out at Ionia State Hospital
differ relatively little from those carried on at other state mental
institutions. Little in the way of individual attention can be offered. The incoming patient is given a mental and physical examination upon arrival and assigned to a ward. Contact with his
staff physician is frequent at first while evaluation is in process,
but the longer the patient remains in the hospital, the less frequent
are the doctor's interviews. The records studied indicated that
only 33 percent of the patients were seen by a doctor as often as
once every three months and 61 percent were seen by a doctor only
every six months. The infrequency of doctor-patient interviews
is not solely caused by crowded conditions. Since the interview
should further some recognizable goal, if such a goal does not exist,
the interview will be unproductive and is therefore less likely to
be held.
Other therapeutic efforts consist primarily of relieving the
patients of their social and legal responsibilities and exposing
them to a healthy hospital environment. Such techniques have
definite value, although limited to be sure, and ·with this minimum treatment alone a large percentage of the individuals committed as incompetent could probably be expected to reach a
state of legal competency in a relatively short period of time if
the hospital were to concentrate on this goal. Other therapeutic
endeavors consist of the extensive use of tranquilizing medication,
electroconvulsive shock therapy, and limited group therapy usually
conducted by a psychologist, social worker, or "lay therapist."

C.

Discharge

In addition to commitment and treatment of incompetents,
the Michigan statute provides for their discharge back to the
committing court.24 Since the reason for commitment of the
incompetent is his failure to comply with the standards of competency, one would likewise expect that the criterion for discharge
back to the committing court would be the accused's ability to
24MrCH.

COMP.

LAws § 767.21 (1948).
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"pass" the same competency tests. However, the stated criterion
for such discharge is not the three-pronged competency test but
that of "restoration to sanity."
"When [the accused] ... shall be restored to sanity, and
that fact has been determined by the superintendent of said
hospital or by any other proceeding authorized by this section, the said superintendent of said hospital shall forthwith
certify that fact in ,;vriting to said judge and prosecuting attorney. The judge shall thereupon immediately require the
sheriff without delay to bring such person from the said hospital and place him in proper custody until he is remanded to
prison, brought to trial or judgment, as the case may be, or is
legally discharged." 25
This use of the "restoration to sanity" standard can again be explained by the fact that the statute covers procedures for commitment and discharge of both incompetents and those found nonresponsible. The proposition that the legislature in the case of
incompetents intended "restoration to sanity" to refer specifically
to the three-part competency test is supported by the Michigan
Attorney General's office:
"[I]t would seem that the law does differentiate between
those individuals who are committed because they are criminally insane, which fact has justified their acquittal on criminal charges, and those individuals who are committed because they cannot stand trial. In the case of a person who is
committed after acquittal as criminally insane, the legal and
logical test to be applied would seem to be whether he has
actually been restored to sanity so that he no longer represents
a threat to society.
"But, in the case of an individual who is committed before
trial, the legal and logical test would seem to be whether he
has been restored to sanity to the extent that the reason for his
commitment no longer exists, i.e., that he now is 'capable of
understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against
him and of comprehending his own condition in reference to
such proceedings and of assisting in his defense in a rational
and reasonable manner.' " 26
It is probable that this vague criterion for discharge - "restoration to sanity" - is partly responsible for the indicated lack of
25 MICH, COMP. LAws § 767 Z/ (1948). (Emphasis added.)
Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to Conference on Overcrowded Conditions at Ionia State Hospital, September 8, 1960.
26
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defined therapeutic goals in treatment of incompetents at Ionia.
Further, the vague term "sanity" can justify retention of incompetents until it is felt "safe" to return them to society, a criterion
for discharge apparently underlying many cases. Moreover, this
statutory criterion also justifies the hospital's frequently stated goal
of restoring "soundness of mind" to the incompetent before discharging him.

D. Parole
The Michigan incompetency statute was amended in 1947
to provide that any patient may be paroled or given a leave of
absence by the hospital superintendent. This amendment, part
of the present statute, provides:
"The superintendent of the Ionia state hospital may grant
a parole or leave of absence to any person committed under
the provisions of this section subject to such conditions as may
be prescribed by the department of mental health, provided
such parole is concurred in by the committing court after due
notice has been given by mail to the prosecuting attorney of
the county from which the patient was committed.
"Such paroled person committed under the provisions of
this section who has not recovered sanity but whose discharge,
in the judgment of the superintendent, will not be detrimental
to the public welfare and will not be injurious to the patient,
may be discharged, provided such discharge is concurred in
by the committing court and due notice has been mailed to
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the patient
was committed within 10 days prior to such discharge.''27
Our study shows that the hospital requires a high degree of
mental alertness and exemplary conduct before even considering
a patient for parole. Before a patient can be paroled he must
come before a staff conference composed of all the doctors plus
the ward attendants, psychologists, and social workers. As in the
case of doctor visitations, the frequency of a patient's staff conferences varies inversely with the length of his confinement at the
hospital. At first he may be "staffed" as often as every three
months. But as time passes the meetings are held less and less
frequently and it is not unusual for long-time patients to be staffinterviewed less than once every two years. The records indicate
27MrCH.

COMP.

LAws § 76721 (1948).
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that the standards which the doctors set for those seeking parole
are "soundness of mind," "social competency," and "emotional
maturity." In addition, factors quite apart from the patient's
mental state are considered. Whether the patient has a home in
Michigan, whether he has a family to look after him, and whether
he can find employment are fully as important to his chance for
parole as is his mental condition. In one instance, a woman had
been in the hospital for over two years and the reports were extremely pessimistic concerning her condition. It appeared that
her chances of parole or discharge were exceedingly remote when
a letter arrived from a lawyer expressing concern. This was followed by an inquiry from the committing court. Immediately the
tone of her progress reports changed and within three months she
was paroled.
Once paroled, the patient must meet strict standards of conduct
to retain his valued status. He may not drink, drive a car except
as necessary in his work, or marry without permission from the
hospital. He must report periodically to the parole authorities at
a clinic or state hospital near his home, and he must be able to
hold a job and make a successful adjustment in society. If he is
able to maintain these high standards of conduct for a period of
three years, he is then eligible for discharge.
Although the statute provides for discharge of paroled persons
who have "not recovered sanity," it is clear that anyone meeting
the criteria for parole could meet the relatively modest standards
required in order to stand trial. The provision for parole makes
no sense as part of incompetency to stand trial procedure. If the
defendant is well enough for parole, he is well enough for trial.
If he is to be tried after discharge from parole, such a procedure
denies him his right to a speedy trial guaranteed him by the Michigan constitution28 and state statute,29 and is vulnerable to a charge
of invalidity. If he is not to be tried, but is to be released into
society after discharge from parole, the only proper way for the
28 MICH, CONST. art. 2, § 19.
20 "The people of this state and

persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall
have a speedy trial and determination of all prosecutions and it is hereby made the duty
of all public officers having duties to perform in any criminal case, to bring such case to
a final determination without delay except as may be necessary to secure the accused a
fair and impartial trial." MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.l (1948). (Emphasis added.) It be•
labors the obvious to suggest that parole of incompetents is not necessary to secure them
a "fair and impartial trial."

1088

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

state to hold him as a parolee would appear to be by means of a
civil commitment.30
IV.

SOME RESULTS OF THE MICHIGAN SYSTEM

A.

Legal Results

We earlier indicated belief that some persons have been sent
to Ionia who are not in fact legally incompetent and that there
appears to be a conflict between the apparent goals of incompetency law and the hospital goals in treating incompetents. At
common law it was for the protection of his rights that an incompetent was not tried, and this same idea appears to be the basis
for the Michigan statute. Once the defendant is again competent
to stand trial the desire to protect his rights should compel his
early return to the committing court for trial. Society also has the
"right" to try him at this time. But since the hospital does not
concentrate on the goal of making the defendant competent for
trial, and in many cases instead concentrates on achieving the more
difficult goal of restoring "soundness of mind," many defendants
are deprived of a chance to complete their trials.
If our estimate is correct that many incompetents at Ionia could
be readied for trial with existing facilities in a short period of time,
it is indefensible that for a substantal number of defendants commitment to Ionia is the equivalent of a life sentence. During the
period July 1954 to December 1960 a total of 470 defendants were
committed to Ionia as incompetent to stand trial, a rate of about
84 admissions per year. During this same period approximately
105 were discharged back to the committing court, a rate of little
more than 16 per year.31 Even if there is added to this figure approximately 15 who are paroled in any given year there are many
more admitted to Ionia than are released. How many of the present 755 incompetents will be discharged is impossible to say with
complete accuracy but if the past rates are any guide, the number
discharged is likely to fall well short of one-half. The rest can
so It should also be pointed out that this anomalous provision for parole is probably
a major reason for the confusion in therapeutic goals at the hospital and the lack of
concentration on readying the accused for trial. As a result the 124 persons paroled during
the past ten years should instead have been returned to the committing court as competent
to stand trial.
31 The hospital reported 319 releases during 1958-1959. However, most of these were
committed for diagnosis only. Incompetents comprise only a small percentage of these
releases.
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expect to spend the rest of their lives at the hospital.32 This system
accounts for the clear preference of many incompetents for confinement at the state penitentiary at Jackson rather than commitment
to Ionia.
Moreover, confinement at Ionia because of incompetence to
stand trial is not deemed imprisonment to be computed upon the
patient's subsequent conviction and sentence.33 The sentence
begins to run only after conviction. This should be contrasted
with the provisions of a Michigan statute33 a which requires an application to the probate court for civil commitment to retain those
patients who have been convicted of a crime but who subsequently
are sent to Ionia because of mental illness and are still residents at
Ionia when their sentences expire. The incompetent who has
never faced trial need never be civilly committed under the present
procedures.
Instead of protection for the defendant until he is ready for
trial, the administration of mental incompetents more closely resembles an alternative to the regular penal system. Through the
use of incompetency law those found dangerous to society by reason of mental affliction can be isolated without the formalities of
trial and conviction. Statutory ambiguity and hospital misunderstanding are not solely to blame. Acquiescence by the courts and
police in a system producing the above figures on "inflow and outflow" of incompetents suggests satisfaction with the system's operation. The almost total lack of judicial or police inquiry into a
patient's progress suggests indifference to whether these persons are
ever brought to trial. This is demonstrated by the additional fact
that in most cases when the defendant is discharged to the committing court the charges against him are dismissed, and he is
released without trial. The authors reviewed the records of 21
incompetent patients discharged back to the committing court for
trial. The records showed that 14 of these patients were returned
to the Recorder's Court in Detroit. A review of these records
at the Recorder's Court by the authors revealed that not one
of the 14 had been tried after being returned to the court.
This fact lends support to the conclusion that the Ionia State Hos32 E.g., J. C., a sixty-six-year-old man, was committed to Ionia pending trial on a
gross indecency charge in 1926. He is still under treatment at Ionia, now showing signs
of "simple psychosis."
331n re Roberts, 310 Mich. 372, 17 N.W.2d 218 (1945).
33• MICH. CoMP. LAws § 330.68 (1948).
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pital is often used as a place to incarcerate persons without benefit
of trial. When this period of incarceration is ended the state apparently considers that adequate punishment has been accomplished. Thus it appears that the emphasis in fact is not on protection of the accused but on protection of society.
Although the Michigan competency statute, providing for examination and commitment of the defendant, is not invalid on its
face, commitment for an indefinite period of time and without
periodic and thorough review appears to violate34 the protection
afforded the defendant by the due process clause of the federal
constitution35 and the due process and speedy trial clauses of the
Michigan constitution.36

B. Non-Legal Results

I. The Doctor at the Incompetency Hearings. Certainly
most doctors would agree that their proper function in hearings
to determine competency consists of a scientific evaluation of the
patient and an accurate and useful presentation of the scientific
conclusions to the court. The abhorrence of the psychiatric discipline for value judgments involving the moral and ethical behavior
of its patients is well known; 37 yet in the Michigan commitment
proceedings the physician seems to forget this abhorrence when
dealing with his legal brethren. All too often in this situation he
not only evaluates the defendant's psychological status, but judges
his behavior, estimates its social and ethical significance, and decides on a fitting consequence, be it commitment or trial. Such a
sacrifice of professional identity and its replacement by a quasilegal status is not without a price; the physician has enormously
complicated if not completely lost his therapeutic advantage. The
patient who feels that he has been committed as the result of his
confidential utterances to the examining physician loses confidence
not in just the "committing doctor" but in all physicians.
2. The Doctor at the Hospital. The label "hospital" connotes a long tradition of alleviation of pain and suffering dictated
by the appropriate and humane application of the science and the
art of medicine. Such application is traditionally entrusted to an
84 See

Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv.

L. R.Ev. 943 (1927).
35 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
36 M1CH. CoNsr. art. 2, § 16 (due

process); § 19 (speedy trial).
LAW 406-08 (1952).

37 See GUITMACHER &: WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
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individual having both in name and in function the title "doctor."
The patient admitted to Ionia State Hospital by virtue of the distorted role of the examining physician has already begun to suspect
the individual bearing the title "doctor" and to wonder at his
intentions.
Many of the patients at Ionia State Hospital do not consider
it a hospital but rather a prison and, in fact, an extremely undesirable prison. For the majority, it is a prison to which one is
committed on an arbitrary and incomprehensible basis; it is a
a prison in which apparent medical functions are carried on in a
mechanical fashion without reference to any previous or future
framework; it is a prison in which hopes of release gradually are
transformed into despair and finally into psychotic delusions. The
Ionia atmosphere is predominantly composed of feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. Such feelings have their origin in, and
are reinforced by, the uncertainty of the statute, the uncertainty in
the mind of the court, and the uncertainty in the minds of the
examining physicians. Uncertainty continues at the hospital in
the minds of the patient and the doctors.
Is the hospital dealing with an alleged criminal or with a sick
human being? Is its role that of a non-judgmental, therapeuticallyoriented institution, or is it in fact a custodial burying ground for
potentially dangerous persons who by social caprice and legal conscience are not sent to prison? Is its goal to restore its patients to
health and to social competency or to provide the necessary treatment which would allow the patient to achieve legal competence?
It is answers to these questions that Ionia State Hospital lacks, and
it is this lack which produces the stultifying mechanical nature of
its proceedings and the insidious pessimism of its atmosphere.
Improvement in the hospital's physical facilities or even in
the size and quality of its staff could not alone bring about an
effective hospital operation. A realizable therapeutic mission is the
sine qua non of a successful hospital.
3. Significance for the Patient. What of the patient? How
does he react to the uncertainty and the endless drifting to which
he is subjected? The answer is simple: he becomes sicker. The
records studied at Ionia are replete with examples of patients who
in the initial stages of their hospitalization made significant improvement. However, because such improvement was not measured against any therapeutic framework or applied to any definite
goal other than vague concepts of social competency or "restora-
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tion to sanity," it passed almost unnoticed. At such a time the
patient is struck by the realization that his chances of release are
remote. His already sick and flimsy personality structure collapses
and the frightening hostility and desolating worthlessness against
which the patient has struggled are intensified. Possibilities of
mental health become more remote. Questions of parole or discharge become academic. The picture of the gradually decreasing
frequency of the doctors' visits and the less frequent staff interviews looms large. Concepts of incurability are considered by both
patient and hospital staff. Many human beings are lost, not a
dozen or fifty, but literally hundreds, to themselves and to society.
V.

A LOOK AT ALTERNATIVE METHODS

A. Federal Procedure
The examination of the defendant to determine competency
under the Michigan statute is generally conducted in the county
jail. Examination in a jail atmosphere has been severely criticized
on the ground that no thorough physical, mental, or neurological
examination is possible under prison conditions and because rarely
is a study of a case history of the defendant even attempted.38
In an attempt to eliminate these defects, the federal government
has enacted a statute39 which provides that whenever the defendant's mental competency to stand trial becomes an issue in a
criminal case the trial court may order the defendant to a mental
hospital for observation and examination.40 If at the end of the
examination period the doctors' report indicates a state of present
incompetency, the court conducts a competency hearing. If the
court is then convinced of the defendant's inability to proceed, it
may order his commitment.41
However, this system would not solve all of the Michigan
problems. Although it is true that an examination at a hospital
would be more thorough than one in jail, the confusion which
exists in Michigan between non-responsibility and incompetency
could still exist. Furthermore, hospital staffs, just like individual
doctors, are susceptible to the idea that it is more humane to the de38 See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of
Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw 8: CoNTEM. PROB. 419 (1935).
39 18 u.s.c. § 4244 (1958).
40 Some states have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 27,
§ ll8 (1954); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 29-20·01 (1960); WIS. STAT. § 9572.7 (3) (1959).
4118 u.s.c. § 4246 (1958).
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fendant to declare him incompetent than it is to require his trial
to proceed.
Neither the federal system nor the Michigan system makes
provision for the incompetent defendant with a valid defense on
the merits to raise initially this defense.

B. Model Penal Code Approach
In addition to providing for examination of the accused by a
"psychiatrist" rather than by a "reputable physician," the Model
Penal Code42 provides for a determination by the judge at the
initial stages of the proceeding of both the defendant's mental
competency to stand trial and his responsibility for the criminal
act. 43 The latter determination can be made in Michigan only if
the accused is competent to stand trial. Under the Model Code if
the medical report by the examining psychiatrist indicates that the
defendant suffered from a mental disease which "substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and the court
is satisfied that such impairment was sufficient to exclude responsibility, the court shall enter judgment of acquittal on the ground
of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility."44 This avoids
commitment on the grounds of incompetency and removes the
threat of a trial. This is important for the psychiatrists participating in our study strongly believe that the threat of trial and the uncertainty of his status deters the recovery of incompetents at Ionia.
The Model Code's provision for non-responsibility eliminates
any reference to "right" or "wrong."45 A person is non-responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law. This is a meaningful and significant
contribution to the law relating to trial competency. The Model
Code recognizes that many commitments for incompetency are
the result of dissatisfaction with the harsh tests of responsibility.
This dissatisfaction too often leads to prosecution and defense
acquiescence in automatic classification of a defendant as incompetent to stand trial and to speedy commitment to a state hospital.
42 MODEL
43 MODEL
H MODEL
41i MODEL

PENAL
PENAL
PENAL
PENAL

CODE §§ 4.01-.09 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955).
CODE § 4.05 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
CODE § 4.07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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The provisions of the Model Code permitting the court to find the
defendant non-responsible at the initial sanity hearing will be
effective in removing the threat of a trial upon the defendant's
hospital release only if there is also liberalization of the traditional
M'Naghten rules of criminal responsibility.46
C.

Trial on the Merits at the Option of the Defendant

A defense may exist which does not depend on the competency
of the accused for its assertion. For example, counsel for the defendant may be able to show that the prosecution is barred as a
matter of law; or that the indictment on its face discloses that the
statute of limitations has run; or that he can assert an affirmative
defense which does not require the defendant's personal participation.47 Frequently an affirmative defense is jeopardized by the
passage of time. Memories fade, witnesses die or move away, and
documentary records may become unavailable. In many cases
the defense will be that of non-responsibility; here the longer a
trial is postponed, the more difficult it is for the defendant to
make such a defense. Indeed, in this situation, it is to the defendant's advantage to be seen by the jury before regaining his
sanity. The vital question, then, is whether defendant's counsel
can proceed with an affirmative defense without, by so doing, foreclosing his client's incompetency plea.
In this country a few states permit a defendant a trial on the
incompetency issue along with a trial on the merits.48 A recentlyenacted provision of the Texas Criminal Code49 provides that the
jury shall state in the verdict whether the defendant is "sane or
insane" at the time of the trial. If the issue of the defendant's
46 The M'Naghten rules require for a showing of nonresponsibility that the accused,
at the time he committed the act, was laboring under such a "defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's
Case, IO Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). In America the M'Naghten
test is still the primary test of criminal responsibility. In at least 29 states it is the only
test, and in others it is still the main test supplemented only by the irresistible impulse
test. See WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER. 51, 69-72. Cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This case abolished the M'Naghten rule in the District of Columbia
by replacing the right-wrong test with one which asks if the defendant is suffering from a
mental disease or defect and if the criminal act is the product of such mental disease or
defect. However, the liberalizing of the responsibility law signaled by Durham has not
gained acceptance. See Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Development of the Law of
Criminal Responsibility in the District of Columbia, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289 (1959).
47Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 832 (1960).
.
48 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 456-57.
49 TEX. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 932b (Supp. 1960).
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competency is tried along with the criminal charge and it is found
that the defendant is "insane at the time of the trial" 50 he is then
committed to a state mental hospital. When it is determined that
he has recovered his "sanity," the proceedings against him continue. Although it is not specifically stated in the statute, the clear
implication is that the defendant is entitled to a new trial even if
he is found guilty of the crime at the same trial which found him
incompetent to stand trial. It also appears that the defendant is
entitled to go ahead with the trial on the merits of the criminal
charge even though he may in fact be incompetent. In Ex parte
Hodges5 1 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the
accused was deprived of his rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and by the state constitution to a speedy trial and to effective aid of counsel where the trial
court declined to proceed to trial in a murder case and required a
preliminary trial to determine the sanity of the defendant.
Two recent English cases have considered the question of a
trial on the merits prior to a competency determination. In
Regina v. Roberts5 2 the Queen's Bench held that the defense
counsel could try the general issue of his client's guilt prior to
the competency determination without sacrificing! the incompetency plea.53 The nature of the defense which the defendant's
counsel wished to raise was not disclosed. The court indicated that
in the event the defendant were found responsible for the crime,
but at the same time incompetent for trial, he would be sent to a
hospital for the criminally insane. The court did not discuss the
different and difficult problem of what disposition was to be made
of the defendant upon a subsequent restoration to competency.
However, in 1957 the Queen's Bench declined to follow the
Roberts case, holding that a jury must be sworn to try the fitness
of the defendant to plead as a preliminary issue.54 It was said that
an insane man cannot be tried.
50 Ibid.

166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958).
[1954] 2 Q.B. 329.
113 "[T]o insist on the issue of fitness to plead being tried [first] might result in the
grave injustice of detaining as a criminal lunatic a man who was quite innocent; indeed,
it might result in the public mischief that a person so detained would be assumed, in the
eyes of the police and of the authorities, to have been the person responsible for the
crime -whether he was or not - and investigations which might have led to the apprehension of the true criminal would not take place." Regina v. Roberts, (1954] 2 Q.B.
829, 833.
54 Regina v. Beynon, [1957] 2 Q.B. Ill.
lll

52
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Professor Foote of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
has proposed a plan similar to the procedure followed in Regina
v. Roberts whereby at the defense counsel's option the case would
be tried on the merits without foreclosing the defendant's protection of the incompetency plea.55 His plan includes the following
provisions:
" (1) In the event that the prosecutor or court moves for
pre-trial mental examination to determine competency, if the
defendant is unrepresented counsel should be appointed to
represent him on the motion. Only in this way can there be
assured full development of an issue which may have an adverse effect on the defendant. If the defendant (perhaps because of his illness) refuses counsel,56 an amicus curiae should
be appointed to make an independent presentation of the defendant's interests.57
" (2) After the court has proceeded to have the defendant
mentally examined and has heard evidence on the issue of
competency to stand trial, if it finds that the defendant is competent it should so rule and all subsequent proceedings will
follow their normal course. If the court is of the opinion that
the defendant is incompetent, a ruling to this effect should be
deferred if (a) counsel moves to dismiss the indictment, or for
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, or raises any other
matter which can be determined in a pre-trial hearing, or (b)
counsel alleges that there is a good faith defense on the merits
and chooses to go to trial on the merits notwithstanding defendant's incompetency. In these situations the court shall
determine the pre-trial question or proceed to a trial on the
merits. If as a result the indictment is dismissed or if there
is a finding of not guilty on the merits, that will be the end of
the matter, although of course the court or [the prosecuting
attorney] ... can refer the defendant's case to the appropriate
local mental health authorities for possible state civil commitment. If there is a verdict of guilty, the court should then
rule that the defendant is incompetent, set the verdict aside
and commit the defendant ... until he is sufficiently recovered to be retried or until other appropriate disposition can
be made of the case.
supra note 47, at 845-46.
United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 171
(2d Cir. 1956)." Foote, supra note 47, at 845 n.40.
57 "This suggestion was made in Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where it was anticipated that defendant would refuse counsel." Foote, supra note
47, at 845 n.41.
55 Foote,

56 "E.g.,
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" (3) The procedures outlined in (2) above should also
be made available at defendant's election. Under present
law counsel representing a defendant who is both probably
incompetent and probably not guilty on the merits is required
to make an election prejudicial to his client. If he moves for
a pre-trial finding of incompetency, he waives any possibility
of seeking a present determination on the merits, whereas if
he goes to trial on the merits he waives the incompetency
issue.''58
Professor Foote's plan has considerable merit and should be
studied carefully. If the defendant were found not guilty on the
merits he would not face the ignominy of a commitment as a criminally insane person. A civil commitment carries no such stigma
and if the defendant were mentally ill he would be entitled to be
treated as a patient, not as a potential criminal. If he were acquitted on grounds of non-responsibility, he would be committed
to a hospital, and since he would not have a trial awaiting him upon
his discharge, his treatment could be geared solely to his mental
condition with the threat of trial no longer impeding his cure.
If he were found guilty of the crime he would not be sent to prison
but the verdict would be set aside and he would be committed to
a hospital as a person incompetent to stand trial.
The Foote plan does not suggest what should be done with a
guilty defendant upon his restoration to competency, other than
retrial or "other appropriate disposition."59 Nor did the Roberts
case need to deal ·with this problem. But the problems attendant
to this part of the Foote plan cannot be ignored. Facing a virtual
"free trial" at the defendant's option, prosecutors and judges could
be expected to raise the issue of the defendant's competency much
less frequently. If the defendant were without counsel, it is likely
that in many more cases than at present he would be tried and
convicted simply because no one raised the competency issue.

VI.

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Statutory Changes

The present Michigan parole system in conjunction with incompetency law is not only anomalous but may very likely be unconstitutional as well, for if the defendant is well enough for parole
58 Foote,
59 Id. at

supra note 47, at 845-46.
846.
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he is well enough for trial. Therefore, parole should be eliminated
from the Michigan incompetency statute. In addition, the statute60
should be amended to achieve separation of incompetency from
responsibility criteria. The problems of legal incompetency to
stand trial and legal responsibility for criminal acts are separate
and distinct61 and to attempt to set up machinery for handling
both problems within a single statute only results in confusion.
The procedures for examination, commitment, and treatment of
incompetents should be described in a separate statute or provision
which should make clear that the criteria for finding a person incompetent, commitment, and discharge back to the committing
court are the same.
Serious consideration should be given to making the time
spent at Ionia as the result of an incompetency commitment a
"credit" against any subsequent conviction and sentence. 62 Since
the defendants are kept under as rigid supervision and control as
they would be in the state prison, and since society is as fully protected by isolating them at Ionia as at Jackson, it would seem fair
to allow the time spent at Ionia to be computed against any subsequent sentence. To complement this proposition, consideration
should be given to amending the statute to provide for defendant's
discharge from Ionia and for civil commitment, if necessary, when
the maximum prison sentence would have expired.
An alternative proposal would require amending the statute
to provide for a maximum period of time for which the defendant
could be committed as incompetent. For example, the statute
could provide that at the end of a two-year period he would have
to be discharged from Ionia and then either tried or civilly committed. This would set an absolute time limit on the possibility
of trial, which should have salutary therapeutic effects, if not during, then certainly after the two-year period, since the uncertainty
of a trial appears to be a factor which inhibits recovery from the
mental affliction. It would also exert pressure on the hospital staff
to ready the defendant for trial. To protect the defendant, the
statute should include a provision that no treament to speed restoration to competency should be given if it would have deleteri60 MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948).
61 The problems of administration are

distinct, but the severity of the responsibility
tests is likely to affect the extent to which the incompetency procedures are used. See
WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 53.54 (1956).
62 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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ous effects on final and ultimate recovery. 63 Thus responsibility
for the ultimate cure in severe cases of mental illness would be left
with civil institutions.

B. Articulation of Goals
Part of the problem in the administration of the incompetency
law today appears to stem from a deviation from the original purpose of the proceedings, which was to afford the incompetent defendant protection from trial. It is our belief that prosecutors and
judges view Ionia as a convenient place to send those defendants
who cannot carry the burden of the non-responsibility plea, and
yet are such pitiful subjects that they prefer to consign them to
Ionia rather than to prison. 64 If this contention is correct, commitment has become a sentencing without a trial. Unless adequate
safeguards are provided to protect the incompetent from remaining the forgotten man of the legal system, and unless clear goals
are articulated which are comprehensible to both lawyer and doctor, he ·will continue to be assigned to Ionia for treatment, only to
be lost and ultimately forgotten.
In this process the first role of the physician should be that of
an expert witness. It is his job to offer a scientific description of
the defendant to the court with clear-cut substantiation of his conclusions. The merits of such testimony and its relevance to the
legal question of incompetency are matters to be decided by the
judge or jury. The doctor's second function is to apply his
therapeutic skills to the treatment of the patient committed to a
hospital on the grounds of incompetency. Here the therapeutic
approach and the medical judgments must lie completely within
the province of the physician. Nonetheless, the goals toward
which the physician strives and the results which he hopes to attain
63 This provision would prevent extensive shock or drug therapy which could render
the defendant competent at the expense of his ultimate recovery to full mental health.
64' Professor Weihofen believes that incompetency procedures are used to avoid con•
viction of mentally disturbed defendants who could not carry the arduous burden of the
M'Naghten criminal responsibility tests. He refers to figures for Scotland and England
to support his view and states: "The same factors also operate in varying degree in the
American states. I have no statistics, but it is my impression that an increasing proportion
of the cases are disposed of on a plea of mental unfitness to stand trial, instead of by the
actual trial in which the disorder is raised as a defense. In New York, I understand this
is now as prevalent a practice as in England; over half the cases are disposed of this way.
This has the advantage of avoiding the expense and effort of a criminal trial, as well as
the advantage of employing a less rigid and artificial legal test of 'insanity.'" WEIHOFEN,
THE URGE TO PUNISH 53-54 (1956).

llOO

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

through his efforts must be defined by the law. 65 The law must
make its standards clear and meaningful to the doctor to enable
him to evaluate a defendant's competency and to apply his
therapeutic skills in restoring his patient's fitness for trial in the
shortest possible time consistent with ultimate recovery of mental
health.
John H. Hess, M.D.
Henry B. Pearsall, S.Ed.
Donald A. Slichter, S.Ed.
Herbert E .Thomas, M.D.
£5 It should be noted that the concept of incompetency as it exists in the law does
not exist in medicine. No physician within the framework of his science or his experience
alone can sensibly state that a given individual is incompetent. Incompetency is a legal
definition, not amenable to precise medical standards of mental health. Psychiatrists,
upon whose testimony and judgment the administration of the law depends, need a definition not in terms of "incompetency to stand trial" but rather in psychoanalytic ego
functions.

